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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal from an order of the district court denying 
injunctive relief under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 
16 U.S.C. S 1536 et seq., presents a number of interesting 
questions under the ESA and under the law of collateral 
estoppel. The plaintiffs, who include (by their popular 
names) the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, the Green Sea Turtle, and 
the Virgin Islands Tree Boa, which are endangered or 
threatened species, and also a number of individuals who 
own real property and reside in the vicinity of Vessup Bay 
in the east end of St. Thomas (the habitat of these species), 
filed suit to enjoin the construction of a temporary housing 
project in nearby Estate Nazareth. The project was a 
hurried response to the devastation wrought by Hurricane 
Marilyn, which struck St. Thomas in December 1995 and 
displaced many people from their homes. The gravamen of 
the complaint is that the project would cause harm to the 
turtles and the Tree Boa species in violation of the ESA. 
 
This is the plaintiffs' second lawsuit. In theirfirst action, 
see Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 918 F. Supp. 879 (D.V.I. 
1996), plaintiffs alleged that the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency ("FEMA"), the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service ("FWS"), and instrumentalities of the Virgin 
Islands Territorial Government had violated the ESA as well 
 




as the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") because 
they had failed to follow specific procedures which are 
designed to ensure that the relevant governmental actors 
had adequately considered the risks that the housing 
project threatened to inflict on the Tree Boa and the marine 
environment of Vessup Bay during the planning and 
construction phase. 
 
The case was assigned to Judge Finch, who held an 
evidentiary hearing held in late January 1996. In a written 
opinion, Judge Finch found that there was no clear 
evidence that Tree Boas actually inhabited the project site 
or that the project site was the source of sedimentation 
run-off into Vessup Bay. Also satisfying himself as to the 
adequacy of FEMA's proposed mitigation measures, he 
concluded that defendants had satisfied their duties under 
the ESA and NEPA, and denied plaintiffs' request for 
preliminary injunctive relief. With respect to plaintiff's ESA 
claims, Judge Finch did not address the substantive 
requirements of S 9 of the Act, holding only that with 
respect to the procedural requirements of S 7, the 
defendants had engaged in the requisite consultation 
process so as to "fulfill their duty to safeguard the future of 
the Tree Boa." Judge Finch alternatively found that he felt 
compelled to dismiss the ESA claims for failure to satisfy 
the statute's notice requirements, and we affirmed. See 
Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 82 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(table). 
 
Plaintiffs then discontinued that action and instituted the 
present action, which is against the federal defendants 
only, still seeking to enjoin the construction and occupation 
of the housing project. See Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 
939 F. Supp. 1195 (D.V.I. 1996). In the new action, 
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief only under the ESA, 
alleging that, in providing the temporary housing shelters, 
defendants had violated the procedural requirements of S 7 
and the substantive requirements of S 9, thereby causing 
irreparable harm not only to the endangered Tree Boa but 
also to the endangered Hawksbill Sea Turtle and the 
threatened Green Sea Turtle. Judge Brotman, to whom the 
matter was reassigned following Judge Finch's recusal, held 
a hearing in early August 1996 and received substantial 
 




evidence in addition to that taken by Judge Finch, 
including new and qualitatively different evidence that was 
favorable to plaintiffs. 
 
At the threshold, Judge Brotman decided that, with 
regard to the turtles, plaintiffs had not satisfied the 
requirements of the ESA that notice be given to the 
appropriate cabinet officer, which is a prerequisite to their 
right to sue. Additionally, Judge Brotman gave preclusive 
effect to the factual findings made by Judge Finch in the 
previous action, relying extensively on Judge Finch's 
finding that FEMA's mitigation measures were adequate to 
protect the Tree Boa and the marine environment of Vessup 
Bay. Then, basing his decision almost entirely on Judge 
Finch's findings and not on the significant new evidence 
that he had received, Judge Brotman concluded that 
plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on the 
merits of their ESA claims or irreparable harm to the 
species they sought to protect because "[w]ith the 
mitigation measures in place, the temporary housing 
project at Estate Nazareth will not affect adversely the Tree 
Boa, the Hawksbill Turtle, the Green Sea Turtle, or these 
animals' habitats." Id. at 1210. He denied preliminary 
injunctive relief, and plaintiffs now appeal. 
 
As an initial matter, this appeal requires us to determine 
whether satisfaction of S 11 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. S 1540(g), 
is a prerequisite to plaintiffs' suit with respect to the turtles 
because the plaintiffs failed to notify the Secretary of 
Commerce of their intent to sue sixty days before filing this 
action. Under the ESA and the regulations promulgated 
thereunder, the Secretary of Commerce must be notified of 
claims concerning endangered sea turtles in a marine 
habitat. The plaintiffs had given notice of their suit only to 
the Secretary of the Interior, whom the ESA and its 
regulations requires to be notified of claims concerning 
harm to sea turtles in a terrestrial habitat. Plaintiffs submit 
that the duplicitous notice requirements are not only 
fatuous, particularly with respect to the Hawksbill Sea 
Turtle which occupies both habitats and surely does not 
know when it crosses from the jurisdiction of the Secretary 
of Commerce to that of the Secretary of the Interior, but 
also extraordinarily difficult to decipher given the 
complexity of the regulatory scheme. 
 




We acknowledge the difficulty that the public must have 
in understanding the highly technical nature of the 
statutory scheme, quite forcefully elucidated in Judge 
Roth's dissent. However, S 11 and its accompanying 
regulations still must be given effect, and as we read them, 
they mandate that, with respect to the turtles, notice to the 
Secretary of Commerce was required before filing suit. 
Plaintiffs, who were represented by counsel at all times, 
failed to comply with this requirement. On this basis, the 
district court noted that, even if plaintiffs could establish 
sufficient evidence to merit the issuance of injunctive relief 
as to the Hawksbill and Green Sea Turtles, "this court 
would dismiss these claims for failure to comply with the 
ESA's notice requirement." 939 F. Supp. at 1203. Although 
the district court did not formally dismiss plaintiffs' claims 
with respect to the sea turtles, it should have done so. 
 
We next consider plaintiffs' challenges to the district 
court's denial of injunctive relief. The foremost 
consideration here is whether Judge Brotman erred in 
giving preclusive effect to Judge Finch's factual findings in 
determining whether to grant injunctive relief to the 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that, because a preliminary 
injunction proceeding is not "final," findings made in the 
course of such a proceeding are not entitled to preclusive 
effect. They also contend that, with respect to their ESA 
claims, because Judge Finch provided alternative holdings 
in support of his decision, any findings relating to those 
claims are dicta and cannot support collateral estoppel. 
Additionaly, they claim that, since the issues actually 
litigated in the first proceeding pertained to NEPA 
violations, not ESA violations, there were not identical 
issues present here and hence there is no basis for 
preclusion. Finally, plaintiffs submit that, irrespective of the 
operative statutory authority, Judge Brotman was 
presented with new and qualitatively different evidence 
from that which was before Judge Finch, so that Judge 
Finch's findings of fact were limited to the time of the first 
hearing and could not appropriately be given preclusive 
effect. 
 
We do not agree that factual findings established in 
cognate prior litigation can never be given preclusive effect. 
 




However, because Judge Finch's findings made with respect 
to plaintiffs' ESA claims were clear dicta, they can not 
support the application of collateral estoppel. To be sure, 
some factual findings, made with respect to the NEPA 
claims, might have merited the application of collateral 
estoppel had they been addressed to a contemporaneous 
ESA claim. However, plaintiffs' second suit presented a new 
and significantly different factual setting, such that Judge 
Finch can not be said to have decided the same issues as 
were presented by plaintiffs' second action. More 
specifically, in the six months that lapsed between the two 
proceedings, plaintiffs discovered quantitatively different 
evidence of live, injured, and dead Tree Boas near the 
project site, in contrast to Judge Finch's findings that no 
Tree Boas existed on the project site. This finding had 
driven his conclusion that the mitigation measures were 
adequate to "safeguard the future of the Tree Boa." 
 
Under these circumstances, it was incumbent upon 
Judge Brotman to ground his findings on the new evidence. 
We also note that, in making his findings, Judge Finch had 
credited the defendants' representation that the housing 
project was temporary in nature, and he reviewed 
mitigation measures that were designed for a project of six 
months duration. However, by the time of the evidentiary 
hearing before Judge Brotman, the project had been under 
construction for eight months, and defendants had 
represented to the court that the project was now expected 
to last up to eighteen months past the completion of 
construction. In sum, Judge Brotman erred when he 
decided that Judge Finch's findings barred relitigation of 
the factual issues presented by plaintiffs' claims. 
 
This result is buttressed by the impact of the current 
serious adverse financial condition of the Virgin Islands 
Housing Authority ("VIHA"). It is now clear that the project 
is in limbo, as there are insufficient funds to continue 
construction or to take it down.1 These pragmatic factors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See The Virgin Islands Daily News, July 1, 1997 (reporting the 
statement of VIHA Director Conrad Francois at a Senate Hearing that the 
agency is nearly bankrupt; that it owes $1.4 million for the estate 
Nazareth Temporary Emergency Housing Project (due to FEMA's refusal 
to release funds pending audit); that the Authority has delayed work on 
42 units at Estate Nazareth; and that another 60 units are not anywhere 
near completion (despite a waiting list for the units)). 
 




combined with the significance of the new evidence before 
Judge Brotman further counsel the need for a new and 
unconstricted look at plaintiffs' claims. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the 
district court and remand to the district court for 
reconsideration of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary 
injunction with respect to the Tree Boa in light of all 
relevant evidence available to it. As this matter must come 
before the district court for final hearing, we suggest to the 
district court that it consolidate the preliminary injunction 
hearing and final hearing pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, 
and in view of the distressed situation of the project, that 
it list the matter for an early hearing.2  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The defendants additionally contend that the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, the 
Green Sea Turtle, and the Tree Boa, all of which are named plaintiffs in 
the present action, lack standing to sue under the ESA. There are two 
groups of plaintiffs in the present action: the protected animals and the 
humans who own real property and reside in the vicinity of the Estate 
Nazareth housing project. It is not disputed that the human plaintiffs 
have standing to sue under the ESA, and therefore we need not consider 
the standing to sue of the animals named as plaintiffs. See Watt v. 
Energy Action Educational Foundation, 454 U.S. 151 (1981); Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264, & n.9 
(1977). (We note in passing, however, that the standing to sue of the 
animals protected under the ESA is far from clear. 
 
In several cases, standing has been extended without significant 
analysis to members of protected species that have allegedly been 
injured. See Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 852 
F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1988) (the Loxioides bailleui "has legal status 
and wings its way into federal court as a plaintiff in its own right"); 
see 
also Marbled Murrelet v. Babbit, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1996); Mt. 
Graham Red Squirrel v. Yeutter, 930 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1991); Northern 
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479 (W.D. Wash. 1988); Northern 
Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991); Cabinet 
Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685 
F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Additionally, in Marbled Murrelet v. Pacific 
Lumber Co., 880 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the district court 
determined, without resort to the authorizing provision of the ESA, that 
because of its protected status under the ESA, the Marbled Murrelet 
"ha[d] standing to sue in its own right." Id. at 1346 (citations omitted); 
see also Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida, 
896 F. Supp. 1170, 1177 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (same). 
 




I. Facts & Procedural History 
 
The underlying facts are set forth in detail in Virgin 
Islands Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 884-91, and Hawksbill 
Sea Turtle, 939 F. Supp. at 1197-99. For present purposes, 
we make only the following general account. 
 
A. The Estate Nazareth Project 
 
In September 1995, Hurricane Marilyn struck the Virgin 
Islands, displacing hundreds of people from their homes 
and causing extensive property damage. Indeed, five 
months after the hurricane, many low-income residents of 
St. Thomas were still living in emergency shelters or in 
condemned homes. President Clinton declared the Virgin 
Islands a disaster area, and FEMA made funds available to 
the Virgin Islands Housing Authority for a housing project, 
which would consist of prefabricated structures sufficient to 
house 550 people. VIHA reviewed several sites and selected 
an area of 8.5 acres at Estate Nazareth, which is adjacent 
to Vessup Bay. As originally planned, the project would be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
On the other hand, in two reported cases in which the naming of an 
animal as a party was explicitly challenged, the courts, in thoughtful 
opinions, concluded that a protected animal did not have standing to 
bring suit. See Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. 
New England Aquarium, 836 F. Supp. 45, 49-50 (D. Ma. 1993) (granting 
defendants' motion to remove dolphins name from caption of case 
because they lacked standing to sue under the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act); Hawaiian Crow v. Lujan, 906 F. Supp. 549, 551-52 (D. 
Haw. 1991) (holding that Hawaiian Crow was not a "person" with 
standing to sue under S 11 of ESA). In reaching this conclusion, these 
courts analyzed the language of section 11 of the ESA. The provision 
expressly authorizes citizen suits brought by "any person," 16 U.S.C. 
S 1540(g)(1), and the Act defines the term "person" to mean "an 
individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other 
private entity." 16 U.S.C. S 1532(13). Accordingly, the courts reasoned 
that Congress's use of the term "person" as defined in S 1523(13) does 
not include the non-"private," un-"associated" animal. Moreover, Judge 
Wolf observed that if Congress "intended to take the extraordinary step 
of authorizing animals ... to sue, they could, and should, have said so 
plainly." Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, 836 F. Supp. 
at 49. 
 




temporary, as the displaced persons would live on the 
project site only until VIHA repaired their permanent 
housing. VIHA expected the number of persons residing at 
Estate Nazareth to decrease rapidly in the first six months. 
 
In preparation for the Estate Nazareth project, FEMA 
prepared a Final Environmental Assessment Report (the 
"EA"), in which it analyzed any effects the project might 
have on the environment, discovering in the process that 
the project site may be a prime habitat of the endangered 
Virgin Islands Tree Boa (Epicrates monensis granti). FEMA, 
in consultation with FWS and the local Division of Fish And 
Wildlife ("DFW"), developed certain mitigation measures 
intended to avoid significant harm to the Tree Boa species. 
The measures included hand clearing of brush prior to the 
operation of any machinery on site, and collection and 
transfer of any snakes found. The procedure of looking for 
Tree Boas, which are nocturnal animals, would involve 
examining the rocks and brush where the snakes take 
refuge during the day. The EA also proposed the restoration 
of habitat following dismantling of the project. 
 
FEMA also recognized that Vessup Bay was a "sensitive 
habitat," which would receive the run-off from the housing 
project. Although the EA failed to mention the Hawksbill 
and Green Sea Turtles specifically, both are endangered or 
threatened species that have habitats in the Bay. The EA 
described measures designed to mitigate the effects of 
sedimentation and sewage run-off, including sewage 
control, land clearing guidelines, and prevention of soil 
erosion. The EA was issued on November 16, 1995. On the 
same day, FEMA issued a Finding of No Significant Impact, 
in which it expressed its conclusion that the mitigation 
measures provided for in the EA would compensate for any 
significant environmental impacts that might occur. 
 
On December 4, 1995, construction of the Estate 
Nazareth housing project began. The site was cleared in the 
manner designated by the Tree Boa mitigation measures 
provided for in the EA. No Tree Boas were found. Mitigation 
measures intended to retard soil erosion were also 
instituted. Following rain showers in mid-January 1996, 
sediment began to appear in Vessup Bay. In the course of 
construction, VIHA performed mitigation measures in 
 




addition to those recommended by the EA, including laying 
down gravel and installing silt fences, in order to prevent 
further runoff into the Bay. 
 
To date, construction of thirty-eight buildings has been 
completed, thirty-one of which are occupied. Forty two 
units are nearly ready for occupancy but another sixty are 
far from completion. Although originally intended to last six 
months, as FEMA has now described the project, it will last 
no more than eighteen months from the date of completion 
or occupation. 
 
B. The First Action 
 
In the first action, eighty-six St. Thomas residents and 
property owners, together with the Virgin Islands Tree Boa 
as a named plaintiff, brought suit against FEMA, the FWS, 
the Governor of the Virgin Islands, the Commissioner of the 
Virgin Islands Department of Planning and Natural 
Resources, the Executive Director of VIHA, and VIHA, 
seeking to enjoin the construction and occupation of the 
housing project on the grounds that the defendants had 
violated various federal and territorial laws. Only the claims 
based on the ESA and NEPA are relevant here; Judge Finch 
rejected the others as infirm as a matter of law, and those 
rulings are not appealed. Plaintiffs asserted that FEMA and 
FWS had failed to fulfill their duties under the ESA. Virgin 
Islands Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 892. More specifically, 
plaintiffs claimed that in the course of defendants' 
construction of the housing project, defendants had failed 
to conserve the protected species, as required byS (7)(a)(1),3 
or to ensure through consultation with various agencies 
and the preparation of a "biological assessment" that the 
project would not jeopardize the continued existence of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 7(a)(1) of the ESA provides: 
 
       Federal agencies shall, in consultation with and with the 
assistance 
       of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the 
       purpose of this chapter by carrying out programs for the 
       conservation of endangered species and threatened species listed 
       pursuant to section 1533 of this title. 
 
16 U.S.C. S 1556(a)(1) (1985). 
 




Tree Boa and sea turtles, as required by S 7(a)(2) and S 7(c)(1).4 
Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that construction and 
occupation of the temporary housing project effectuates a 
"taking" of the Tree Boa and sea turtles in violation of S 9(a) 
of the ESA.5 Finally, plaintiffs complained that FEMA had 
prepared an Environmental Assessment ("EA") instead of a 
more detailed Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") in 
violation of NEPA. 
 
Judge Moore granted a temporary restraining order to the 
plaintiffs and then recused himself. Judge Finch was then 
assigned the case, and from January 29 through 31, 1995, 
he held an evidentiary hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a 
preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs' expert on the Tree Boa 
and their habitat, Dr. Peter Tolson, testified that the Estate 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA provides: 
 
       Each federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the 
       assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, 
       funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to 
jeopardize 
       the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened 
       species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
       habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary ... to 
       be critical, unless such agency has been granted an exemption for 
       such action. 
 
16 U.S.C. S 1536(a)(2). 
 
Section 7(c)(1) of the ESA provides: 
 
       To facilitate compliance with the requirements of[section 
1536(a)(2)] 
       each Federal agency shall ... request of the Secretary information 
       whether any species which is listed or proposed to be listed may be 
       present in the area of ... proposed action. If the Secretary 
advises, 
       ... such agency shall conduct a biological assessment for the 
       purpose of identifying any endangered species or threatened species 
       which is likely to be affected by such action ... . 
 
16 U.S.C. S 1536(c)(1). 
 
5. Section 9(a)(1)(B) provides in pertinent part: 
 
       [I]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the 
       United States to take any [endangered or threatened species of fish 
       or wildlife listed pursuant to S 1533 of this title] within the 
United 
       States or the territorial sea of the United States. 
 
16 U.S.C. S 1538(a)(1)(B). 
 




Nazareth housing project is a prime habitat for the Tree 
Boa, and that construction of the project has jeopardized 
and will continue to jeopardize the existence of the Tree 
Boa by reducing its habitat and increasing the chances that 
Tree Boas will be killed by humans and feral animals. He 
testified that, at the time of the hearing, the latest sighting 
of a Tree Boa of which he was aware was in the Fall of 
1995, before Hurricane Marilyn. Plaintiffs also presented 
evidence that the increased sedimentation in Vessup Bay 
would damage the sea grass beds on which the turtles 
depended for food. 
 
Defendants adduced testimony that efforts to locate Tree 
Boa conducted during the day on the Estate Nazareth 
project site had failed to demonstrate the Tree Boa's 
existence there. Additionally, defendants presented evidence 
of FEMA's mitigation efforts, as proposed and implemented 
as of that stage in the project. With regard to the 
sedimentation build-up in Vessup Bay, defendants 
developed evidence that the run-off came from an 
alternative source, id. at 899, and that mitigation efforts 
would reduce the possibility that run-off would carry soil 
into Vessup Bay. 
 
Based on this evidence, Judge Finch entered an order 
denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. With 
respect to the Tree Boa, Judge Finch noted that the court 
could not find that the snakes did in fact live at the project 
site. Id. at 892. Additionally, he found that, "[w]hile some 
question remains about the adequacy of the mitigation 
measures as they existed in early January of this year," the 
project provided for adequate mitigation of potential adverse 
effects on the Tree Boa and its habitat, and that "people 
already living nearby, cars traveling through the area, and 
animals pose enough threat that the temporary addition of 
at most 550 people ... poses no significant increase in the 
dangers already facing the Tree Boa." Id. at 891. Based on 
these factual findings, the judge concluded that FEMA had 
complied with NEPA's procedural requirements when it 
conducted the EA. Id. at 898. 
 
Addressing plaintiffs' ESA claims, Judge Finch held that 
FEMA had conducted the "Section 7 consultation" with 
FWS necessary to ensure that it did not take an action that 
 




jeopardized the "continued existence of the Tree Boa." Id. at 
901-02. Without specifically addressing plaintiffs' S 9 claim, 
Judge Finch noted that, even if the plaintiffs could succeed 
on the merits, he would have to dismiss their ESA claims 
for failure to provide notice to the Secretary of Commerce 
and the defendants, as the statute and its implementing 
regulations require. 
 
With respect to plaintiffs' ESA claims regarding the 
Hawksbill and Green Sea Turtles, Judge Finch noted that, 
because plaintiffs had failed to allege that any harm had 
occurred or would occur to either species of turtle or to the 
grasses upon which the turtles feed, the claims were not 
properly before the court. Id. at 892, n.23, & 899-900. 
Judge Finch determined as a matter of fact that, even if 
they had brought viable claims with respect to the turtles, 
plaintiffs had failed to "prove sufficiently that the Estate 
Nazareth Project was the source of any run-off into Vessup 
Bay." Id. at 900. The plaintiffs appealed to this Court and 
we affirmed. Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 82 F.3d 408 
(3d Cir. 1996) (table). 
 
C. The Second Action 
 
Before the case in front of Judge Finch could proceed to 
a final hearing, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that 
action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Forty-seven of the 
original property owners then joined with five additional 
property owners and two new animal species -- the 
Hawksbill Sea Turtle and the Green Sea Turtle -- as named 
plaintiffs, and moved for a temporary restraining order in 
the District Court for the District of Columbia. Pursuing 
claims under the ESA only, plaintiffs alleged that, in the 
course of construction of the housing project, defendants 
had violated S (7)(a)(1) and (2), S 7(c)(1), and S 9. The district 
court denied plaintiffs' request for temporary injunctive 
relief and transferred the case to the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands. 
 
Judge Brotman, to whom the case was reassigned after 
Judge Finch recused himself, held an evidentiary hearing 
on August 7 and 8, 1996 on plaintiffs' application for a 
preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs presented an affidavit from 
 




Dr. Tolson in which he reiterated his belief that the project 
site was a prime habitat for Tree Boas and that 
development of the site has had and will continue to have 
detrimental effects on the Tree Boa population and its 
habitat. More specifically, he testified that the Tree Boa 
population would be threatened by an influx of feral 
predators and human predators, that habitat near the 
project site cannot support Tree Boas fleeing the cleared 
project site, and that as more Tree Boas die, there will be 
a concomitant reduction in the genetic viability of the 
species, and thus a further risk to its survival. 
 
Dr. Tolson also stated that in the brief period since 
February 1996 there had been six documented sightings of 
Tree Boas within one half mile of the project site, in 
contrast to the thirty-eight sightings reported since the 
early 1970's. This translates to .85 Tree Boa sightings per 
month since construction on the Estate Nazareth, as 
compared to an average of .13 per month in the period 
before construction. Plaintiffs also presented the affidavit of 
a lay witness, who testified to observing a live Tree Boa 
within one half mile of the Estate Nazareth project on two 
occasions in late spring 1996 (after Judge Finch's 
evidentiary hearing), and a dead Tree Boa in June. 
 
Judge Brotman denied the requested preliminary 
injunction. He first determined that Judge Finch'sfindings 
of fact relevant to the action before him, which essentially 
were that "[w]ith the mitigation measures in place," the 
housing project "does not and will not adversely affect" the 
Tree Boa, the Hawksbill Sea Turtle, the Green Sea Turtle, 
or these animals' habitat," would "be conclusive of the 
factual issues underlying plaintiffs' present request for 
injunctive relief." 939 F. Supp. at 1207-08. Judge Brotman 
concluded, based for the most part on Judge Finch's 
findings and not on the evidence before him, that plaintiffs 
had failed to demonstrate that they were likely to succeed 
on the merits of their S 9 claims or that the protected 
species were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent 
injunctive relief. Id. at 1210-11 & n.27. With respect to the 
turtles, Judge Brotman noted that, even if plaintiffs had 
demonstrated that injunctive relief was merited, the court 
would have to dismiss the action for failure to comply with 
 




the notice requirements of the ESA. Id. at 1203. Finally, 
Judge Brotman concluded that defendants had carried out 
programs for the conservation of the Tree Boa, the 
Hawksbill Sea Turtle, and the Green Sea Turtle, and had 
insured that the housing project was not likely to adversely 
modify these species' habitats, as required for success 
under S 7(a)(1) and (2). Id. at 1210. 
 
II. Notice to the Secretary of Commerce 
 
As a threshold matter, this appeal requires us to 
determine whether, because plaintiffs failed to notify the 
Secretary of Commerce in addition to the Secretary of the 
Interior of their intent to sue sixty days beforefiling this 
action, they failed to provide proper notice as required by 
16 U.S.C. S 1540(g)(2)(A), and thereby required the district 
court to dismiss their claims with respect to the turtles. 
Plaintiffs contend that they satisfied the notice 
requirements by providing the Secretary of the Interior and 
the FWS with the requisite sixty days written notice (each 
of which had ample opportunity to redress the alleged 
violations of the ESA). We disagree. 
 
Section 11(g) of the ESA authorizes persons to commence 
civil suits in order to compel compliance with the Act, but 
"prohibits" any citizen suit "prior to sixty days after written 
notice of the violation has been given to the Secretary, and 
to any alleged violator." ESA S 11(g)(2)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. 
S 1540(g)(2)(A)(i). The ESA defines "Secretary" to mean "the 
Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce as 
program responsibilities are vested pursuant to the 
provisions of the Reorganization Plan Numbered 4 of 1970." 
ESA S 3(15), 16 U.S.C. S 1532(15). The Reorganization Plan, 
in turn, assigns to the Secretary of Commerce certain 
enumerated functions formerly under the supervision of the 
Secretary of the Interior. See Reorg. Plan 4 (1970), 5 U.S.C. 
App. 1 (1996).6 
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6. These functions include: 
 
       (a) All functions vested by law in the Bureau of Commercial 
       Fisheries of the Department of the Interior or its head, together 
with 
       all functions vested by law in the Secretary of the Interior or the 
       Department of the Interior which are invested through the Bureau 
       or are primarily related to the Bureau, ... 
 
Reorg. Plan No. 4 (1970), 5 U.S.C. App. 1. 
 




The Department of Commerce and the Department of the 
Interior share jurisdiction over the implementation of the 
ESA. See 50 C.F.R. S 402.02(b) (1995) (addressing 
interagency cooperation in implementing the ESA). 
Moreover, under 50 C.F.R. S 221, which implements, in 
part, the ESA, see 50 C.F.R. S 221.1 (1995); see also 50 
C.F.R. 217.1-2 (1995) (noting scope of regulations as 
implementing statutes enforced by the Department of 
Commerce), the two departments actually share jurisdiction 
over the turtles. 
 
50 C.F.R. S 222 explicitly provides that the species of fish 
and wildlife at issue here are under the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary of Commerce. 50 C.F.R. S 222.23 (listing Atlantic 
Hawksbill Sea Turtles and Green Sea Turtles). Similarly, 
the Commerce Department's National Marine Fisheries 
Service "has sole jurisdiction for sea turtles while the 
turtles are in the water." 50 C.F.R. S 222.23(a); see also 50 
C.F.R. 1 227.4 (1995) (stating that the Secretary of 
Commerce maintains jurisdiction over the Green Sea 
Turtle). Once the turtles are on land, however, S 222.23(a) 
states that the Department of the Interior's U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service has jurisdiction. Thus, when the turtles are 
swimming in the bay, Commerce bears regulatory 
responsibility, and when the turtles return to the beach, 
the regulatory baton passes to Interior. The parties agree 
that the boundary between land and sea is the mean high 
water mark. Only the protected species of fish and wildlife 
not listed in S 222.23, including the Tree Boa, are under 
the sole jurisdiction of the Secretary of Interior. 50 C.F.R. 
S 217.2. 
 
In the present action, plaintiffs allege that the housing 
project will harm the marine and land habitat of the turtles, 
thereby forcing the turtles to abandon "their traditional 
shelter and nesting sites in and around Vessup Bay." The 
alleged harm to the turtles cannot be viewed as occurring 
solely or primarily on land. Plaintiffs allege that the 
construction of the housing project has and will continue to 
result in increased sedimentation run-off into Vessup Bay. 
This sedimentation apparently blocks the sunlight 
necessary for the growth of the sea grass on which the 
turtles feed and promotes the growth of algae, which 
 




smothers the sea grass beds. This "degrades and ultimately 
kills those grasses... and will cause the[ ] turtles to either 
abandon this habitat or starve." Plaintiff's Appellate Brief 
at 20. 
 
The regulations implementing the ESA instruct that the 
Secretary of Commerce, in addition to the Secretary of the 
Interior, has jurisdiction over the turtles named in 
plaintiffs' present action. Providing notice to the responsible 
Secretary(ies), which the relevant regulations indicate to be 
both the Secretary of Commerce and the Interior, is a 
prerequisite to suit. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 
U.S. 20, 31 (1989) (holding that compliance with analogous 
notice provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act ("RCRA"), was a "mandatory condition precedent" to 
suit); Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (notice requirement of the ESA is 
"jurisdictional"); Protect Our Eagles Trees (POETs) v. City of 
Lawrence, Kansas, 715 F. Supp. 996 (D. Kan. 1989) 
(dismissing ESA and Clean Water Act ("CWA") claims for 
failure to comply with jurisdictional sixty-day notice 
requirements); see also Public Interest Group of N.J. Inc. v. 
Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1189 n.15 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting 
that an analogous provision in the CWA was a 
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit). 
 
Accordingly, and unfortunately for the plaintiffs, their 
failure to notify the Secretary of Commerce of their 
intention to sue sixty days prior to suit failed to satisfy the 
Act with respect to the claims regarding the turtles. Thus, 
although the district court did not formally dismiss the 
plaintiffs' claims with respect to the turtles, it should have 
done so. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 
U.S. 365 (1978) (noting that the limits upon federal 
jurisdiction must be neither disregarded nor evaded); see 
also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. 
Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d S 3522 
at 62 (1987) ("[I]t would not simply be wrong but indeed 
would be ... unconstitutional" if the federal courts "were to 
entertain cases not within their jurisdiction."). 
 
Plaintiffs argue incorrectly that, because the Department 
of the Interior and not the Commerce Department had been 
active in the consultation process with FEMA, and because 
 




they had notified the Secretary of the Interior of their intent 
to file suit, they satisfied the Act's notice requirements for 
all practical purposes and should be allowed to proceed 
with a viable claim in the district court. The Supreme 
Court, faced with an analogous notice provision under the 
RCRA, made clear that, where plaintiffs' fail to fully comply 
with the notice requirement, the court must dismiss the 
underlying suit. Hallstrom, 492 U.S. at 23. 
 
In Hallstrom, petitioners had given notice of their 
intention to file suit to the alleged violator but had not 
notified the EPA. The Supreme Court held that, even 
though the EPA had expressed no interest in taking action 
against the alleged violator, so that notice to the agency 
could be of no practical effect, the unambiguous language 
of the notice provision prohibited the district court from 
giving that language "a flexible or pragmatic construction." 
Id. at 24-27. The Court held that the notice requirements 
can not "be disregarded by the district court at its 
discretion" and, instead, complete satisfaction of 
requirements "is a mandatory, not optional, condition 
precedent for suit." Id. at 26; see also Save the Yaak Comm. 
v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 721 (9th Cir. 1988) (letters sent to 
various state and federal legislators did not satisfy the 
notice requirement because notice had not been sent to 
requisite parties). 
 
Plaintiffs contend that this Court's decision in Public 
Interest Research Group v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239 (3d 
Cir. 1995), establishes that a hyper-technical reading of the 
ESA's notice requirements is not required by Hallstrom and 
in fact is inappropriate where, as allegedly is the case here, 
the underlying purposes of the Act counsels against 
dismissal of the action. In Hercules, petitioners notified the 
requisite federal and state agencies and the alleged violator 
of their intent to assert sixty-eight violations of the CWA. 
The petitioners waited the requisite sixty days andfiled a 
complaint, which included more than thirty alleged 
violations of the CWA that were not contained in the 
original notice. The district court dismissed, but we 
reversed, holding that the notice letters did not fall short of 
the statutory requirements despite the fact that the 
defendants were not notified of all of the petitioners' 
allegations. 
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In doing so, we compared the flaws of the notification 
letter with the congressional purposes of the notice 
provision, which are: (1) giving the alleged violator an 
opportunity to remedy the alleged violations; and (2) giving 
the federal agencies with statutory enforcement powers an 
opportunity to commence their own enforcement action. Id. 
at 1246 (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414 at 80 (1971), reprinted in 
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745). We found that when a 
petitioner notifies the requisite parties and provides 
sufficient information to permit the recipient to address the 
alleged violations, notice is sufficient. Id. at 1246-49; see 
also Marbled Murrelet, 83 F.3d at 1073 (letter to federal 
defendants gave adequate notice, even though it 
contemplated suit under S 9 rather than S 7). 
 
Plaintiffs contend that, under Hercules, because FEMA's 
ability to address its alleged violations of the ESA in no way 
turned on whether the Department of Interior or the 
Commerce Department received notice of their intent to 
bring suit, and thus notifying the Commerce Department 
would not have fostered further compliance with the ESA, 
their failure to provide notice to the Secretary of Commerce 
should not prove fatal to their action. However Hercules is 
inapposite. In Hercules, each of the requisite defendants 
had received notice of petitioner's intent to file suit, and 
therefore our focus was on the contents of the notification 
given and not, as was the case in Hallstrom, on whether 
notice was in fact given. 
 
Moreover, in Hercules, we distinguished Hallstrom on the 
ground that while "the literal reading of the statute 
compelled the [Hallstrom] Court's interpretation of the 60- 
day delay requirement, there is no express requirement in 
the statute pertaining to the content of a notice letter." 
Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1249 (emphasis added). As a result, in 
Hercules, when the requisite parties were in fact on notice 
of the alleged violations, we were free to interpret the 
statute flexibly so as to promote the purposes of the Act. 
 
In the case at bar, however, no such room for discretion 
exists. Unlike Hercules, the agency charged here with 
enforcement of the ESA, the Commerce Department, never 
received notice. And, as previously noted, the ESA's notice 
provision explicitly bars citizen suits unless the plaintiff 
 




provides notice to the Secretary(ies) responsible for the 
species at issue, in this case the Secretary of Commerce 
and the Secretary of the Interior, sixty days prior to suit. 
 A literal interpretation of the Act's notice provision in this 
case actually furthers the purposes of that provision by 
giving the Commerce Department the opportunity to 
commence its own enforcement action. It is only when a 
regulatory agency fails to exercise its regulatory 
responsibilities that enforcement through citizen suits 
becomes important. See S.Rep. No. 92-414, at 64, 2 Leg. 
Hist. at 1482, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3730 ("It 
should be noted that if the Federal, State, and local 
agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility, 
the public is provided the right to seek vigorous 
enforcement action under the citizen suit provisions."). 
While it is unclear how the Secretary of Commerce would 
have proceeded had he been given notice of plaintiffs' intent 
to sue, it is not for us to deny the Department the 
opportunity to address the plaintiffs' allegations prior to the 
commencement of litigation. 
 
Finally, plaintiffs urge us not to require dismissal of this 
action with respect to the turtles because the notice 
provision of the ESA is fatuous, in that it requires 
notification of a different agency depending upon where the 
turtles are located at a given moment, and also 
unnecessarily contorted, in that it requires a plaintiff to 
rummage through the complicated implementing 
regulations in order to determine who must be notified. 
While that argument has much appeal, as Judge Roth has 
so carefully illuminated, we are not at liberty to excuse 
plaintiffs' failure on the ground that a technical reading of 
the Act's notice provision would be "inappropriate."7 
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7. We do however think that Congress and the agencies involved should 
put their heads together and fashion a simple and clearer notice scheme. 
To that end, we direct the Clerk of Court to send a copy of this opinion 
with particular attention to this footnote and Judge Roth's dissent to 
counsel for the majority leader and ranking member of the minority of 
the House and Senate Commerce and Interior Committees, and to the 
general counsel of the Department of Commerce and the Department of 
Interior. 
 




As previously discussed, S 11 explicitly prohibits persons 
from bringing suit absent satisfaction of the sixty-day 
notice provision and admits of no exception. Because that 
provision and its implementing regulations admit of no 
ambiguity, the language of the Act must be regarded as 
conclusive. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 
(1984) ("[O]nly the most extraordinary showing of contrary 
intentions from the [legislative history] would justify a 
limitation on the `plain meaning' of the statutory 
language."). Moreover, plaintiffs were represented by 
counsel, who had reason to know that the Secretary of 
Commerce, in addition to the Secretary of the Interior, 
required notification of plaintiffs' intent to sue. Indeed, in a 
supplemental memo to Judge Finch, defendants stated that 
the Commerce Department had jurisdiction over the sea 
turtles in their marine environment.8 Plaintiffs and their 
counsel also must have known that a failure to comply fully 
with the notice provision would result in dismissal, given 
that, in the previous action, Judge Finch specifically noted 
that plaintiffs' failure to notify the federal defendants would 
require the court "to dismiss plaintiffs' [ESA] claims." Virgin 
Islands Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 902. 
 
Despite its conclusion that plaintiffs had failed to satisfy 
the notice requirements of the ESA, the district court did 
not dismiss the plaintiffs' claims with respect to the turtles, 
though it should have done so. Thus, we will remand to the 
district court with instructions to dismiss those claims. In 
doing so, we note that plaintiffs have since given notice to 
the Secretary of Commerce, and they are now at liberty to 
refile their claims and request that the matter be 
consolidated with the Tree Boa proceedings presently before 
the district court.9 
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8. This is thus not a case where laymen are left to unravel a complex 
statutory scheme without the assistance of counsel. Compare Zipes v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397 (1982) (where "technical 
reading would be particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in 
which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process," 




9. At oral argument, government counsel conceded that, should we 
dismiss plaintiffs' ESA claims with respect to the turtles, plaintiffs 
would 
 




III. Denial of Preliminary Injunction 
 
Judge Brotman denied plaintiffs' request for injunctive 
relief under S 7(a)(1) and (2), S 7(c), and S 9 on the grounds 
that plaintiffs had not provided evidence sufficient to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their 
claims or to establish that, absent injunctive relief, the 
protected species would suffer irreparable injury. Hawksbill 
Sea Turtle, 939 F. Supp. at 1210. Plaintiffs challenge Judge 
Brotmans's holding with respect to their S 9 claim on the 
ground that it erred in giving the findings of Judge Finch 
preclusive effect.10 More specifically, plaintiffs contend that 
the application of collateral estoppel was inappropriate 
because: (1) any findings made with respect to plaintiffs' 
ESA claim were part of an alternative holding, and therefore 
not necessary to the prior ruling; and (2) the issues 




not be barred by a statute of limitations challenge from filing a new 
action. As a result of this statement, we need not examine whether 
plaintiffs would otherwise be subject to a statute of limitations under 
the 
ESA or applicable state law. 
 
10. Plaintiffs assert that Judge Brotman erred in holding that Judge 
Finch's finding that defendants complied with the procedural 
requirements of NEPA precluded them from asserting a claim for lack of 
compliance with S 7(c) of the ESA. Given thatS 7(c)(1) appears to 
anticipate that compliance with NEPA procedural measures can fulfill 
obligations under the ESA, see 16 U.S.C.S 1536(c)(1) (if Secretary 
requires biological assessment, "[s]uch assessment may be undertaken 
as part of Federal agency's compliance with the requirements of ... 
NEPA."), we find no merit in plaintiffs' challenge. 
 
11. Plaintiffs additionally contend that, as a matter of law, findings 
made 
in the course of a preliminary injunction cannot support the application 
of issue preclusion. In making this contention, plaintiffs rely on several 
cases holding that orders granting preliminary injunctions are generally 
not accorded preclusive effect in litigation on the merits in the same or 
different proceeding. See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 
396-98 (1981) (no preclusive effect in litigation on merits of same case); 
Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982) 
(refusing to apply collateral estoppel to state court finding made in 
preliminary injunction proceeding in trial on merits of plaintiff 's S 
1983 
claim); Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (refusing to accord preclusive effect to determination made in 
 




As an initial matter, it is not entirely clear whether the 
denial of injunctive relief rested on the preclusive effect 
given to Judge Finch's findings. In concluding that 
plaintiffs had failed to provide sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate irreparable harm, Judge Brotman stated that 
he based his factual findings on the "review of Judge 
Finch's findings, the parties' submissions, and the 
testimony taken at the evidentiary hearing in the present 
matter." Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 939 F. Supp. at 1210-11. 
This statement suggests that he might have reached his 
conclusion based on an independent review of the new 
evidence (some of which was quite compelling for the 
plaintiffs). However, Judge Brotman explicitly adopted as 
"conclusive" those of "Judge Finch's findings of fact with 
respect to plaintiffs' claims in the previous action [that] 
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granting of preliminary injunction in final hearing on the merits in a 
different case); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 F. 
Supp. 1125, 1185 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (Judge's findings, "which are 
addressed to the preliminary motion to dismiss, are not `the law of the 
case[,]' . . . do not control the issues . . . upcoming in connection with 
the motions for summary judgment."). But findings made in granting or 
denying preliminary injunctions can have preclusive effect if the 
circumstances make it likely that the findings are"sufficiently firm" to 
persuade the court that there is no compelling reason for permitting 
them to be litigated again. Dyndul v. Dyndul, 620 F.2d 409, 411-12 (3d 
Cir. 1980); accord Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Bd. of Trade, 
701 F.2d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 1983) (findings made in preliminary 
injunction decisions have preclusive effect "if the circumstances make it 
likely that the findings are accurate [and] reliable"); Wright & Miller, 
supra, S 4434, S 4445; 1 Restatement of Judgments (Second) S 13, supra, 
illus. 1 at 136-37 (1982). (Whether the resolution in the first proceeding 
is sufficiently firm to merit preclusive effect turns on a variety of 
factors, 
including "whether the parties were fully heard, whether the court filed 
a reasoned opinion, and whether that decision could have been, or 
actually was appealed." In re Brown, 951 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Preclusion would seem to be particularly appropriate in a second action 
seeking the same injunctive relief. See Lyon Ford, Inc. v. Ford Marketing 
Corp., 337 F. Supp. 691, 695 (D.C.N.Y. 1971); Wright & Miller, supra, 
S 4445. However, because we determine herein that the issues involved 
in the first proceeding simply were not identical to those presented here, 
we do not decide whether Judge Finch's findings were "sufficiently firm" 
to merit the application of collateral estoppel. 
 




apply to plaintiffs' claims in the present action." Id. at 
1207-08. As a result, we cannot be sure that such an 
unencumbered review took place, and we review the district 
court's denial of injunctive relief through the lens of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine. 
 
A. The Test for Collateral Estoppel 
 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents the 
relitigation of issues that have been decided in a previous 
action. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147 (1979). 
Also referred to as issue preclusion, the doctrine "protect[s] 
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue 
with the same party or his privy and ... promot[es] judicial 
economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane 
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979). 
Traditionally, four factors must be present before the 
application of collateral estoppel is appropriate: (1) the 
previous determination was necessary to the decision; (2) 
the identical issue was previously litigated; (3) the issue 
was actually decided in a decision that was final, valid, and 
on the merits; and (4) the party being precluded from 
relitigating the issue was adequately represented in the 
previous action. Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187, 190 
(3d Cir. 1995). In the case at bar, our attention is focused 
on the first and second factors; however, when any one of 
these factors goes unsatisfied, then the application of 
collateral estoppel is inappropriate, for it would unjustly 
foreclose matters that have yet to be litigated. 
 
Central to our understanding of why, as we conclude 
herein, Judge Finch's findings fail to satisfy the requisites 
for the application of collateral estoppel is an iteration of 
what claims were before the court in the first action and 
how Judge Finch disposed of them. 
 
B. The Holdings of Judge Finch 
 
The factual findings from the first action given preclusive 
effect were made in the course of Judge Finch's 
determination of plaintiffs' claims pursuant to NEPA and 
the ESA. With respect to NEPA, Judge Finch rejected 
plaintiffs' claim that FEMA had violated S 102(2)(C) of NEPA 
 




by preparing an Environmental Assessment ("EA") rather 
than a more extensive Environmental Impact Statement 
("EIS"), which is normally required for "major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment." Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 891-92. Judge 
Finch concluded that the plaintiffs' had failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of this 
claim, because, as FEMA had adequately considered the 
environmental impact of the housing project and provided 
for mitigation measures to reduce "to an insignificant level" 
any adverse effects on the Tree Boa, its Environmental 
Assessment satisfied NEPA's requirements. 
 
In disposing of plaintiffs' ESA claims in turn, Judge 
Finch concluded that FEMA and FWS had conducted an 
adequate S 7 consultation, as required by 16 U.S.C. 
S 1536(a)(2), thereby "fulfilling their duties to safeguard the 
future of the Tree Boa." Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 902. 
Alternatively, Judge Finch found that he was compelled to 
dismiss plaintiffs' ESA claims with respect to the Tree Boa 
for failure to provide proper notice to the Secretary and the 
alleged violator as required by 16 U.S.C. S 1540(g)(1)(A). 
Judge Finch did not address the merits of plaintiffs' claims 
brought pursuant to S 9.12 
 
C. Alternative Holdings 
 
Because Judge Finch determined that he did not have 
the power to hear plaintiffs' ESA claims, any findings made 
with respect to the merit of those claims are not essential 
to the judgement and cannot support the application of 
collateral estoppel. See Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 
F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that collateral 
estoppel is not applicable to finding against plaintiff on 
merits where court also held that plaintiff lacked standing); 
Bokunewicz v. Purolator Products, Inc., 907 F.2d 1396, 1399 
(3d Cir. 1990) (holding that "everything after denial of 
jurisdiction" is "dicta, pure and simple"); Restatement of 
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12. Because we conclude, supra, that, in their second action, plaintiffs' 
failed to satisfy the notice requirements of the ESA with respect to the 
Hawksbill and Green Sea turtles, we do not address Judge Finch's 
factual findings or legal conclusions pertaining to those species. 
 




Judgments, supra, S 20, cmt. b, illus. 1 (dismissal of claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not bar 
relitigation after the jurisdictional defect has been cured) 
and cmt. e; Wright & Miller, supra, S 4421, at 207-08 ("If a 
first decision is supported by findings that deny the power 
of the court to decide the case on the merits and by 
findings that reach the merits, preclusion is inappropriate 
as to the findings on the merits."). As a result, we must 
examine Judge Finch's findings in the context of plaintiffs' 
NEPA claim. 
 
D. The NEPA Claim 
 
In the first action, plaintiffs asserted that FEMA had 
violated NEPA by failing to engage in the requisite before- 
the-fact risk analysis concerning the project site. In 
disposing of plaintiffs' NEPA claim, Judge Finch drew upon 
factual findings he had made at the outset of his opinion. 
Judge Finch first concluded that FEMA did not err in 
preparing an EA rather than an EIS given the evidence that 
the projects would have "insignificant effects" on the Tree 
Boa and Vessup Bay. 
 
Judge Finch then explained why he considered valid 
FEMA's conclusion that the Tree Boa would not be 
significantly affected by the Project: 
 
       [T]he existence of any Tree Boas on the site is 
       uncertain. This Court finds that based on the evidence 
       presented to the Court, the last time one of the World's 
       leading experts on the Tree Boa found one near the site 
       of the Estate Nazareth Project was in 1987, despite 
       having looked for them in 1991. He had not found any 
       following Hurricane Marilyn. The Tree Boas are 
       nocturnal and often the only visible signs of them 
       during daylight are their refugia. Teams of people 
       looked for those signs during the early stages of the 
       construction process at the Estate Nazareth site. No 
       one found any Tree Boas on the site. Likewise, their 
       refugia were not found. Further, habitat remains in the 
       nearby area to provide a place for the Tree Boa to live. 
       A minimal increase in any threat to the Tree Boa will 
       be created by the temporary small increase in the 
       area's human population due to the Project. 
 




Id. at 899. Judge Finch also noted that an EIS need not be 
done "[i]f a mitigation condition eliminates all significant 
environmental effects." Id. at 898. While he cautioned that 
"some question remains about the adequacy of the 
mitigation measures as they existed in early January of this 
year," id. at 890, Judge Finch ultimately concluded that if 
the mitigation measures established by FEMA in the EA 
were followed, the future of the Tree Boa would be 
adequately safeguarded. Id. at 898. 
 
Thus, Judge Finch's ultimate conclusion that FEMA had 
satisfied its procedural duties under NEPA was based on 
the interrelationship between three factual findings: (1) no 
Tree Boas were present on the project site; (2) FEMA had 
adequately planned for the institution of mitigation 
measures designed to protect the species and its habitat; 
and (3) the influx of humans and their concomitant dangers 
would be small in number and temporary. In the second 
action, the district court explicitly referenced only the 
second of these findings -- that mitigation measures 
adequately safeguarded the Tree Boa, and, in fact, explicitly 
noted that the existence of Tree Boa was no longer in 
dispute. However, because the finding as to the adequacy of 
the mitigation measures relies in part upon Judge Finch's 
initial conclusion that no Tree Boas were present and that 
any risk to the species would be temporary, we examine the 
new evidence presented in plaintiffs' second action with 
respect to all three factual findings. Given the new evidence 
and the nature of plaintiffs' ESA claims, to which we shall 
now turn, none of these findings merit collateral estoppel 
effect so as to preclude plaintiffs' from litigating their claims 
before the district court. 
 
E. The New Evidence 
 
Judge Finch's finding that no Tree Boas were present on 
the project site was directly contradicted by evidence 
adduced by plaintiffs in their second action. In thefirst 
proceeding, Dr. Tolson, who is widely acknowledged as the 
leading expert on the Virgin Islands Tree Boa, testified that 
he last saw a Tree Boa in the vicinity of the project site in 
the Fall of 1987. In the second proceeding, plaintiffs 
produced an affidavit by Dr. Tolson, in which he declared 
 




that, since the beginning of construction on the Estate 
Nazareth site, there had been six documented sightings of 
Tree Boas, two of which involved dead or dying animals, all 
sighted within one-quarter to one-half mile from the project 
site. This represents a marked increase in the frequency of 
Tree Boa sightings, of which there were only 38 total 
incidents since the early seventies. Moreover, the number of 
sightings is additionally significant given that the Tree Boa 
population numbers less than 500 animals. 
 
Additionally, in making his findings, Judge Finch 
credited the temporary nature of the housing project, 
concluding that the dangers posed by a short term influx of 
human beings was slight. See supra, at 38-39. 
Furthermore, he reviewed mitigation measures proposed by 
FEMA that were designed for a project of six months in 
duration, and represented that "it would not be extended in 
any circumstances for a total duration exceeding eighteen 
months." Yet by September 1996, the time of the 
evidentiary hearing before Judge Brotman, it was clear that 
the project could no longer be considered "temporary" in 
the sense intended by Judge Finch. The project had been 
under construction for eight months, and defendants 
represented that the project was now expected to last up to 
eighteen months past the completion of construction. As we 
have seen, the project is now in limbo and may last much 
longer. 
 
Collateral estoppel applies only when the same issues 
decided in the past action arise again in the present 
context, see Southern Pacific R.R. v. U.S., 168 U.S. 1, 48 
(1897), so that when significant new facts grow out of a 
continuing course of conduct the issues in a successive suit 
may fail to constitute the same "issue" so as to merit 
preclusive effect. See Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 
1188 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that a 1975 determination 
that unconstitutional crowding existed at a jail could not be 
dispositive of the conditions existing in 1983); Fleer Corp. v. 
Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 485, 513 (D.C. Pa. 
1980) (holding that changes in the baseball card market 
between 1965 and 1980 foreclosed any argument that a 
definition of the relevant market by the Federal Trade 
Commission could preclude relitigation of the market 
 




definition issue); Wright & Miller, supra,S 1417, at 162-63; 
Restatement of Judgments, supra, S 13 cmt. c. Based upon 
this body of law, we do not believe that Judge Finch's 
factual findings precluded consideration of additional 
evidence in support of plaintiffs' ESA S 9 claims. Thus, we 
conclude that Judge Brotman erred in giving Judge Finch's 
findings preclusive effect and failing to examine all of the 
evidence before him in considering plaintiffs' request for 
injunctive relief. 
 
F. The ESA Claims and New Evidence 
 
The inappropriateness of applying issue preclusion to 
plaintiffs' ESA S 9 claim is compounded by the fact that S 9 
requires a different analysis of the facts than did the NEPA 
claims of plaintiffs' first action. Congress, through the 
enactment of NEPA, required FEMA "to take a hard look at 
environmental consequences before taking a major action." 
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983). NEPA's "dominant 
`thrust' ... is to ensure `that environmental concerns [are] 
integrated into the very process of agency decisionmaking.' " 
Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Serv. Elec. & 
Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732, 739 (3d Cir. 1982) (quoting Andrus 
v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 350 (1979)). The procedural 
requirements of NEPA are satisfied if FEMA has proved that 
it has adequately considered the interests of the Tree Boa 
in planning for the Estate Nazareth project. See, e.g., 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978). Thus, 
NEPA provides for a before-the-fact risk analysis procedure, 
and accordingly Judge Finch had to review only 
anticipatory mitigation measures, not the mitigation 
measures as implemented. 
 
Plaintiffs' second action, in contrast, is founded largely 
on allegations that the construction and operation of the 
housing project constituted a "taking" in violation of S 9 of 
the ESA. To "take" is defined in the ESA as "to harass, 
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or 
collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 
U.S.C. S 1532(19). The relevant implementing regulations 
provide that "harm" is defined to include an act "which 
 




actually injures or kills wildlife" or "which annoy [a species] 
to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential 
behavioral patterns." See 50 C.F.R. S 17.3 (superseded). 
According to plaintiffs, these "takings" result from agency 
actions that have killed or injured the Tree Boa, or present 
an imminent threat of doing so, and that have "adversely 
affected its environment to the extent of impairing its 
natural behavior patterns." Hawksbill, 939 F. Supp. at 
1200. 
 
Plaintiffs' S 9 claims in the second action focus on a 
different aspect of FEMA's conduct from their first action. 
Instead of challenging FEMA's planning, they call into 
question the defendants' execution of their agency action. 
That is, even if agency action satisfies the procedural 
requirements of NEPA, it could still constitute a "taking" in 
violation of S 9. 
 
However, instead of examining the evidence regarding 
defendants' execution of their duties based on the record as 
developed before it, Judge Brotman explicitly gave collateral 
estoppel effect to Judge Finch's finding that "the mitigation 
measures established for the projected construction of the 
temporary housing project were adequate." Hawksbill Sea 
Turtle, 939 F. Supp. at 1210. Where S 9 required an 
analysis of whether, given the mitigation measures actually 
implemented, a Tree Boa had been "taken", Judge Finch's 
finding focused exclusively on the proposed mitigation 
measures. Judge Finch, in fact, cautioned that "some 
question remains about the adequacy of the mitigation 
measures as they existed in early January of this year." 
Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 890. 
 
In sum, we conclude that Judge Finch did not decide the 
identical issue (as to the adequacy of the mitigation 
measures) placed before Judge Brotman by plaintiffs'S 9 
claim. We will therefore reverse the order of the district 
court and remand this case to the district court for 
reconsideration of plaintiffs' motion for preliminary 
injunction under S 9 of the ESA brought on behalf of the 
Tree Boa. The district court shall enter an order dismissing 
 




the plaintiffs' claims with respect to the Hawksbill and 
Green Sea Turtles.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. In their second action, plaintiffs asserted that the court should have 
abandoned the normal practice of balancing the equities when 
considering an application for injunctive relief brought under the ESA, 
and focused instead on whether plaintiffs' could demonstrate a likelihood 
of success on the merits. They argued that in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 
(1978), the Supreme Court pronounced that because S 7 contains a flat 
ban on the destruction of critical habitats, it revokes a court's usual, 
equitable discretion to grant equitable relief in an action involving the 
ESA. Hawksbill Sea Turtle, 939 F. Supp. at 1208. This argument may 
have merit and we identify the pros and cons of the issue because the 
district court will have to deal with it on remand. 
 
In a typical preliminary injunction proceeding, a district court would 
consider four factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail 
on 
the merits at the final hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff is 
being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to 
which the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary 
injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest. Merchant & Evans, Inc. 
v. Roosevelt Building Products, Inc., 963 F.2d 628, 632-33 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Only if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to show that all four 
factors favor preliminary relief would the court issue a preliminary 
injunction. Id. The district court applied this test in denying plaintiffs 
motion for injunctive relief, but it is by no means clear that this is the 
test for an injunction under the ESA. 
 
In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the Supreme Court held that 
Congress had explicitly foreclosed the exercise of traditional equitable 
discretion by courts faced with a violation of S 7 of the ESA. At the time 
of that decision, S 7 commanded all federal agencies "to insure that 
actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the 
continued existence" of an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. S 1536 (1976). 
In Hill, the Court affirmed the issuance of an injunction which closed the 
nearly completed Tellico Dam (despite the potential loss of millions of 
dollars), because of alleged harm to the endangered snail darter. In doing 
so, the Court noted that the "language, history, and structure" of the Act 
"indicates beyond doubt" that Congress conclusively determined that the 
public interest always weighed in favor of preservation of endangered 
species. Id. at 174. 
 
We note, however, that Congress has revisited S 7 three times since the 
Court rendered its opinion in TVA v. Hill. See Pub. L. No. 95-632, S 3, 92 
Stat. 3751, 3752-60 (1978); Pub. L. No. 96-159,S 4, 93 Stat. 1225, 
 
footnote continues . . . 
 




1226-28 (1979); Pub. L. No. 97-304, S 4, 96 Stat. 1411, 1417-20 (1982). 
As a result of these amendments, the obligation of the federal agencies 
is now to "insure that any action ... is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species."S 7(a)(2), 93 Stat. at 
1226, codified at 16 U.S.C. S 1536(a)(2) (1982) (emphasis added). The 
amendments also formalized the consultation process and created a 
procedure whereby agencies could seek exemptions for projects unable 
to conform with the requirements of S 7(a)(2) that nevertheless met other 
stringent criteria. Although the amendments weakened the standard 
insofar as the section's protection of listed species is now less 
absolute, 
we are not convinced that they diminish the precedential force of the 
Supreme Court's opinion in TVA v. Hill. Nothing in the amendments or 
their history suggests that Congress intended to overrule TVA v. Hill, or 
to deflate its prioritization of endangered species by returning equitable 
discretion to the courts. See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 816 F.2d 1376, 1383 
n.10 (9th Cir. 1987) (amendments do not alter precedent of TVA v. Hill). 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court appears to have subsequently expressed 
the view that S 7 still limits a court's equitable discretion. In 
Weinberger 
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), the Court held that the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act ("FWPCA") did not foreclose the exercise of 
equitable discretion, and contrasted that statute with the ESA: 
 
       In TVA v. Hill, we held that Congress had foreclosed the exercise 
of 
       the usual discretion possessed by a court of equity.... It was 
       conceded in Hill that completion of the dam would eliminate an 
       endangered species by destroying its critical habitat. Refusal to 
       enjoin the action would have ignored the "explicit provisions of 
the 
       Endangered Species Act." 437 U.S. at 173. ... The purpose and 
       language of the statute limited the remedies available to the 
District 
       Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the 
Act. 
 
456 U.S. at 313-14; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 
U.S. 531, 543 n.9 (1987) (same). 
 
Although TVA v. Hill addressed S 7 of the ESA, this standard for 
injunctive relief might appropriately extend to a claim asserted under 
S 9, which prohibits the "taking" of an endangered species, for the 
language and legislative history of that provision is equally unambiguous 
in its prioritization of the protection of endangered species. The fact 
that 
the protections of S 9 are arguably more extensive than those embodied 
in S 7 lends support to plaintiffs' argument. Section 7, entitled 
"Interagency Cooperation," requires all federal agencies to consult with 
the appropriate wildlife agency to insure that any proposed action is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species or 
destroy its critical habitat. It calls for a risk analysis before the 
fact. In 
 
footnote continues . . . 
 




contrast, S 9 flatly bans certain actions and has a broad scope, extending 
beyond the actions of federal agencies to include both private and state 
actions. See Paul D. Ort, What Does It Take To Take and What Does It 
Take to Jeopardize? A Comparative Analysis of the Standards Embodied 
in Sections 7 and 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 7 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 197 
(1993). 
 
At this juncture, it would seem improper to require a plaintiff to meet 
a different injunctive standard with respect to the substantive S 9 claim 
than a S 7 claim, when the provisions are intended to work in tandem 
towards the same objective, namely, protection of endangered species. 
Other courts have concluded the same, holding that, when faced with a 
request for injunctive relief under the ESA, a plaintiff need only show 
that a defendant has violated the act to be entitled to injunctive relief. 
See Sierra Club, 816 F.2d at 1384 (Sierra Club is "entitled to relief if 
the 
[defendants] violated a substantive or procedural provision of the ESA."); 
Loggerhead Turtle, 896 F. Supp. at 1178 (holding that, if defendants 
violated substantive or procedural provision of ESA, a court does not 
have traditional equitable discretion, instead "any threatened harm is 
per se irreparable harm and ... public interest always favors the 
imposition of an injunction"). 
 
Thus, plaintiffs' challenge raises a serious question, and there is 
certainly a strong argument to be made that the court's discretion is in 
fact limited. But the parties did not brief the isssue here, and, given 
the 
new developments in the case, we think they deserve an opportunity to 
address it anew in the district court. 
 
Judge Weis does not join in this footnote, but agrees with Judge 
Brotman's statement that here "the loss involves the equally incalculable 
value of the sanctity and quality of human life." Consequently, "this 
court will not abandon the traditional equitable principles in evaluating 
plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction; . . . . Hawksbill 
Sea 
Turtle, 939 F.Supp. 1208. 
 




ROTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring and Dissenting : 
 
Although the majority engages in a thoughtful discussion 
of the issues presented in this appeal, I cannot join the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs' Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
claims brought on behalf of the Hawksbill and Green Sea 
Turtles do not satisfy the notice requirements of S 11(g) of 
the ESA, 16 U.S.C. S 1540(g). Accordingly, I would not 
dismiss the claims brought on behalf of the Sea Turtles. In 
addition, because I would not dismiss these claims, I have 
gone on to consider the district's court order refusing 
plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order and 
preliminary injunction on behalf of the Hawksbill and 
Green Sea Turtles. I would reverse that order and remand 
for further proceedings. 
 
I. Notice To "The Secretary" 
 
Although the majority acknowledges the complexity of the 
task it places upon prospective litigants, the labyrinthine 
nature of the ESA's statutory and regulatory scheme 
becomes apparent only upon a closer examination than the 
one given to it by my colleagues. Section 11(g)(2)(A) of the 
ESA provides that no citizen suit may be commenced "prior 
to sixty days after written notice of the violation has been 
given . . . ." 16 U.S.C. S 11(g)(2)(A). The Act nowhere 
specifies the content of this notice but requires that the 
notice be directed to "the Secretary, and to any alleged 
violator . . ." Id. Section 1532(15) defines the term 
"Secretary" to mean "the Secretary of the Interior or the 
Secretary of Commerce as program provisions are vested 
pursuant to the provisions of Reorganization Plan Number 
4 of 1970." 16 U.S.C. S 1532(15). 
 
A daunting amount of investigation is required before a 
potential litigant can determine which "Secretary" to serve 
notice upon. The text of S 1540(g)(2) offers no basis for 
deciding when notice is to be referred to the Secretary of 
the Interior and when notice is to be served upon the 
Secretary of Commerce. Although the ESA refers to 
Reorganization Plan Number 4 of 1970, that document 
merely informs the reader that certain functions, formerly 
committed to other federal agencies, have been transferred 
to the Secretary of Commerce, including: 
 




        (a) All functions vested by law in the Bureau of 
       Commercial Fisheries of the Department of the Interior 
       or its head, together with all functions vested by law in 
       the Secretary of the Interior or the Department of the 
       Interior which are invested through that Bureau or are 
       primarily related to the Bureau, . . . . 
 
        (b) The functions vested in the Secretary of the 
       Interior by the Act of September 22, 1959 (Public Law 
       86-359, 73 Stat. 642, 16 U.S.C. 760e-760g; relating to 
       migratory marine species of game fish). 
 5 U.S.C. App. 1 Reorg. Plan 4 (1970). 
 
Potential litigants, who have not given up at this point, 
can begin combing through Title 50 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations for a clue as to which Secretary should be 
served with notice. The first helpful section encountered is 
50 C.F.R. S 17.2, which purports to define the scope of the 
USFWS's regulations on endangered and threatened wildlife 
and plants: 
 
       By agreement between the [United States Fish and 
       Wildlife] Service and the National Marine Fisheries 
       Service, the jurisdiction of the Department of 
       Commerce has been specifically defined to include 
       certain species, while jurisdiction is shared with regard 
       to certain other species. Such species are footnoted in 
       Subpart B of this part, and reference is given to special 
       rules of the National Marine Fisheries Service for those 
       species. 
 
50 C.F.R. S 17.2(b). 
 
A fair reading of this section is that jurisdiction is shared 
between the USFWS (a Department of the Interior agency) 
and the NMFS (a Department of Commerce agency), and 
that the allocation of species to each service will be 
identified in Subpart B. Such a reading would, however, 
prove to be incorrect. Although Subpart B contains an 
exhaustive list of endangered and threatened flora and 
fauna, it gives no indication which agency possesses 
jurisdiction for the administration of the ESA as to these 
species, and it speaks not a word about pre-suit notice. See 
50 C.F.R. SS 17.11 & 17.12. 
 




Not until Title 50, Chapter II, Subchapter C1 can the 
reader begin to put it all together. In 50 C.F.R.S 217.2 the 
reader is informed that the regulations contained in 50 
C.F.R., parts 216 through 227, 
 
       apply only for fish or wildlife under the jurisdictional 
       responsibilities of the Secretary of Commerce for the 
       purpose of carrying out the Endangered Species Act of 
       1973 (see Part 222, S 222.23(a)). Endangered species of 
       fish or wildlife other than those covered by these 
       regulations are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary 
       of the Interior. For rules and procedures relating to 
       such species, see 50 C.F.R. Parts 10-17. 
 
50 C.F.R. S 217.2. Section 222.23(a) finally designates some 
species as coming under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of 
Commerce: "Atlantic Hawksbill sea turtles (Eretmochelys 
imbricata)" and "Green sea turtles (Chelonia mydas) 
breeding colony populations in Florida and on the Pacific 
Coast of Mexico."2 Section 222.23(a) also states that there 
exists a division of agency jurisdiction for sea turtles: "The 
National Marine Fisheries Service has sole agency 
jurisdiction for sea turtles while the turtles are in the water 
and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has jurisdiction for 
sea turtles while the turtles are on land." Id. 
 
In Chapter IV of Title 50, there finally appear certain joint 
regulations involving the United States Fish and Wildlife 
Service, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. With 
respect to the scope of the regulations on joint 
administration of the ESA, S 402.01(b) explains: 
 
       The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the 
       National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) share 
       responsibilities for administering the Act. . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Subchapter C is inappropriately titled "Marine Mammals," given that 
it informs the reader of the notice requirement as it applies to sea 
turtles, which are not mammals. 
 
2. Far from dealing with pre-suit notice, S 222.23 identifies the species 
for which the NMFS can issue permits to authorize incidental takings for 
scientific purposes or for the enhancement of propagation or survival of 
the affected endangered species. See generally  50 C.F.R. S 222.23. 
 




       Endangered or threatened species under the 
       jurisdiction of the NMFS are located in 50 C.F.R. 
       S 222.23(a) and 227.4. If the subject species is cited in 
       50 C.F.R. 222.23(a) or 227.4, the federal agency shall 
       contact the NMFS. For all other listed species the 
       federal agency shall contact the FWS. 
 
50 C.F.R. S 402.01(b). Section 227.4, referred to above, 
merely identifies Green Sea Turtles as a threatened species. 
A footnote appended to that section observes that NMFS 
jurisdiction for sea turtles is limited to when the turtles are 
in the water. See 50 C.F.R. S 227.4 n.1. 
 
The byzantine nature of these regulations demonstrate 
the magnitude of the burden the majority's decision places 
on a party wishing to sue under the ESA. None of these 
regulations even remotely address the question of notice of 
intent to sue. Indeed, 50 C.F.R. S 402.01(a) states that the 
purpose the regulations promulgated in Part 402 is to 
implement ESA S 7(a) to (d), 16 U.S.C. S 1536(a) to (d), 
dealing with interagency cooperation. It therefore is not 
surprising that S 402.01(b) speaks of which office, as 
between the USFWS or the NMFS, a "federal agency" should 
contact. This language indicates that the drafters did not 
have in mind that the regulations would be would be used 
by potential litigants to identify the Secretary to whom pre- 
suit notice must be provided. 
 
Additionally, the majority fails to consider that a potential 
litigant is being encumbered in this way when the full 
ramifications of a threat to the environment may not be 
fully appreciated. At this early stage, a plaintiff is not likely 
to have complete information about all the species affected 
by a defendant's conduct or about the manner in which 
those species are harmed. Under the majority's holding, a 
plaintiff would have to delay bringing suit to enjoin the 
"taking" of an endangered or threatened sea turtle species 
until it became apparent whether the turtles were being 
harmed while on land or in the water. In the mean time, 
additional animals could be placed in harm's way and 
irreversible environmental damage done. 
 
Indeed, even with the more complete information 
developed in this litigation, it is not clear whether the ESA 
 




violations plaintiffs complain of with respect to the Sea 
Turtles occur while the turtles are on land or in the water. 
As the majority concedes, "plaintiffs allege that the housing 
project will harm the marine and land habitat of the turtles 
. . . ." Majority at 18. Yet, the majority contends that the 
harm to the Sea Turtles cannot be viewed as "occurring 
solely or primarily on land" because plaintiffs allege that it 
is the run-off of sediment from the project site and the 
increase in undertreated sewage in Vessup Bay that 
threaten the turtles. Id. 
 
The majority's view fails to recognize that the destruction 
of the food supplies in the turtles' marine habitat is only 
incidental to the harm that will befall them. Plaintiffs have 
further alleged that the diminution in the turtles' food 
supply will cause them to abandon their traditional nesting 
sites on the beaches abutting Vessup Bay where they are 
protected under the ESA. The danger according to plaintiffs 
is that the turtles will move to "the British Virgin Islands, 
. . . a scant 3-4 miles from the project site," where neither 
species is protected. Plaintiffs' Appellate Br. at 16. There 
the turtles would be subject to harassment and hunting 
while on land as well as in the water. Destruction of the 
turtles' water habitat is only the indirect mechanism by 
which this "taking" is effected. And, the regulations are not 
clear whether the land/water distinction refers only to U.S. 
territorial lands and waters. 
 
Thus, making the notice requirement dependent on the 
locale that a particular species occupies at a given moment 
can give rise to unexpected complications. The fact, 
however, that harsh results may arise from the application 
of a mandatory prerequisite to suit is not enough to permit 
relaxation of those requirements. See, e.g., Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988). 
Nevertheless, my conclusion that the notice given here was 
appropriate is not dependent on any unfairness of the 
result. Instead, it is consistent with the case law on pre- 
suit notice fashioned by the Supreme Court and by this 
Circuit. 
 
The majority follows Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 
U.S. 20 (1989), insisting that it stands for the blanket 
proposition that nothing less than full compliance with the 
 




notice requirement will permit plaintiffs to proceed with 
their suit. Majority at 19. This unyielding view of Hallstrom 
ignores the compelling difference that plaintiffs' supposed 
procedural default here was not "caused by [the] `failure to 
take the minimal steps necessary' to preserve their claims." 
Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 27-28 (quoting Johnson v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975)). Rather, it 
is a product of ambiguities in the statute which require 
resort to unwieldy regulations. 
 
In Hallstrom, the plaintiffs did not even attempt to 
provide notice to state and federal agencies even though 
such notice was clearly required on the face of the citizens 
suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA). The RCRA's citizens suit provision 
unambiguously provided that "no action may be 
commenced . . . (1) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has 
given notice of the violation (A) to the Administrator; (B) to 
the State in which the alleged violation occurs; and (C) to 
any alleged violator . . . ." 42 U.S.C. S 6972(b) (1982). The 
RCRA further conspicuously defined "Administrator" as "the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency." 42 
U.S.C. S 6903(1). Thus, the statute was clear in specifying 
to whom pre-suit notice must be directed. 
 
Plaintiffs here, unlike those in Hallstrom, have provided 
all the notice required by the language of the ESA. Neither 
the provisions of the ESA nor Reorganization Plan Number 
4 of 1970 specify whether the Secretary of the Interior or 
the Secretary of Commerce should receive pre-suit notice. 
Only upon resort to the regulations governing "Wildlife and 
Fisheries," which are nowhere cross-referenced by the 
notice provisions of the ESA, is it possible to infer which 
Secretary should receive notice. 
 
Our decision in Public Interest Research Group of New 
Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995), is 
helpful to explain why plaintiffs' suit is not foreclosed. 
There we construed the notice provision of the Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. S 1365(b), and its regulations to determine 
whether the plaintiffs' notice letter had identified the 
alleged violations with sufficient particularity to provide the 
recipient with effective notice. Id. at 1241-42. We expressly 
relied on the regulations enacted under the RCRA in 
 




concluding that, for the content of the notice letter to be 
adequate, it must provide "the EPA and the state with 
enough information to enable them intelligently to decide 
whether" to initiate an enforcement action, and must give 
the alleged violator "enough information to be able to bring 
itself into compliance." Id. at 1249. 
 
My colleagues maintain that Hercules is of no use here 
since the focus of that case "was on the contents of the 
notification given." Majority at 21. Indeed, we drew this 
distinction in Hercules. 50 F.3d at 1249 ("The Supreme 
Court's focus in Hallstrom was on the timing of the notice, 
not on its content."). We did so, not as an end in itself, but 
because there was "no express requirement in the statute 
pertaining to the content of a notice letter." Id. Under the 
CWA, Congress has "delegated to the EPA the authority to 
determine the necessary contents of a notice letter." Id.; see 
also 33 U.S.C. S 1365(b) ("Notice under this subsection 
shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall 
prescribe by regulation."). 
 
Congress has incorporated into the ESA no such explicit 
delegation of authority to specify who should receive pre- 
suit notice. No provision of the ESA commands that a 
potential litigant look to the regulations promulgated in 
connection with it to determine which Secretary is to be 
given notice. Indeed, not even the regulations directly 
answer this question. 
 
"[A] literal reading of the statute" simply does not 
command that notification be made to the Secretary of 
Commerce. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26. Thus, since no 
relevant statute or regulation has identified without 
ambiguity which Secretary is the proper recipient of 
plaintiffs' pre-suit notice, I do not believe that Hallstrom 
forecloses plaintiffs' ESA claims on behalf of the Sea 
Turtles. 
 
II. Preclusive Effect of the First Action 
 
I write on to briefly address an issue that the majority 
has no need to resolve: whether Judge Finch's factual 
finding that plaintiffs had "not proved a causal connection 
between possible harm to Vessup Bay from silt flowing into 
 




the Bay" and the temporary housing project was entitled to 
be given preclusive effect. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 939 F. Supp. 1195, 1210 
(D.V.I. 1996) (citing Virgin Islands Tree Boa v. Witt, 918 F. 
Supp. 879, 904 (D.V.I. 1996)). I believe that it was an abuse 
of discretion for Judge Brotman to rely upon this factual 
finding in rejecting preliminary injunctive relief for the Sea 
Turtles. Judge Finch's factual finding was no more than 
dictum that followed his conclusions that he was blocked 
from addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' claims brought 
on behalf of the Sea Turtles under either the ESA or NEPA. 
 
It is immediately apparent that Judge Finch viewed the 
claims brought on behalf of the Sea Turtles as not properly 
before the court. In his recitation of the parties' 
contentions, Judge Finch noted that he would "not do a full 
analysis" of plaintiffs' claims brought on behalf of the Sea 
Turtles since plaintiffs had "failed to allege in their 
Complaint or Amended Complaint that any harm had 
occurred or would occur to either species of turtle or to 
sponges or grasses upon which the turtles feed." Tree Boa, 
918 F. Supp. at 892 & n.23. Furthermore, Judge Finch 
found that plaintiffs' NEPA claim brought on behalf of the 
Sea Turtles was "not properly before [the] Court" since 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint "lack[ed] the degree of 
specificity that would indicate that a specific claim [was] 
raised as to these species." Id. at 899-900. 
 
The merits of plaintiffs' ESA claims brought on behalf of 
the Sea Turtles received no consideration before Judge 
Finch. He indicated that all of plaintiffs' ESA claims failed 
to satisfy the notice requirement of 16 U.S.C. 
S 1540(g)(1)(A). Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 891 & 902. Judge 
Finch's subsequent discussion of plaintiff's "Section 7" ESA 
claim, 16 U.S.C. S 1536, omits any reference to the Sea 
Turtles.3 Virgin Islands Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 902. 
Plaintiff's "takings" claim brought on behalf of the Sea 
Turtles, pleaded pursuant to S 9 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 
S 1538, likewise is not addressed. The very brief 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This omission certainly was not an oversight since Judge Finch 
specifically discussed the adequacy of FEMA's consultation with respect 
to the Tree Boa. Virgin Islands Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 902. 
 




examination of these claims manifests Judge Finch's 
apparent belief that they had not been specifically pleaded 
and were not properly before him. 
 
The rule is well settled that "[o]nce a court expresses the 
view that it lacks jurisdiction, the court thereafter does not 
have the power to rule on any other matter." Bunker Ramo 
Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1279 
(7th Cir. 1983); Murdock v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation, 975 F.2d 683, 687-88 (10th Cir. 1992); 
In re Newport Harbor Assoc., 589 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 
1978); Stebbins v. Keystone Ins. Co., 481 F.2d 501, 508-09 
(D.C. Cir. 1973); American Guaranty Corp. v. United States, 
401 F.2d 1004, 1005-06 (Ct. Cl. 1968). But see Crawford v. 
Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1964). As one leading 
treatise has explained, 
 
       [i]f a first decision is supported by findings that deny 
       the power of the court to decide the case on the merits 
       and by findings that got to the merits, preclusion is 
       inappropriate as to the findings on the merits. A court 
       that admits its own lack of power to decide should not 
       undertake to bind a court that does have power to 
       decide. 
 
18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure S 4421 (1981). 
 
The law in this Circuit is in accord. In Smith v. Pittsburgh 
Gage and Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1972), 
we stated that the scope of the district court's decision was 
properly limited to the jurisdictional issue resolved by it 
even though the district court also decided factual issues 
on the merits. More recently in Bokunewicz v. Purolator 
Products, Inc., 907 F.2d 1396, 1399 (3d Cir. 1990), we 
observed that "everything after the denial of jurisdiction 
. . . , including the discussion of substantive issues, was 
dicta, pure and simple." 
 
Even if the alternate bases proffered for the denial of 
injunctive relief for the Sea Turtles are not treated as 
jurisdictional in the strict sense, issue preclusion is not 
appropriate. Judge Finch obviously believed that the 
threshold reasons he had provided for denying relief on 
behalf of the Sea Turtles were dispositive, going so far as to 
 




caution that he would not do a full analysis as to the Sea 
Turtle claims. Virgin Islands Tree Boa, 918 F. Supp. at 892, 
n.23. This is hardly the sort of "firmness" in a judgment 
that justifies denying a party a chance to litigate the matter 
fully in a later action. Thus, Judge Brotman should have 
permitted plaintiffs a full opportunity to develop the factual 
elements of their claims brought on behalf of the Sea 
Turtles. The district court erred in not considering all of the 




For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the plaintiffs to 
proceed with their ESA claims brought on behalf of the 
Hawksbill and Green Sea Turtles. I, therefore, respectfully 
dissent. 
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